Abstract: This paper analyzes the different options -liquidation, federalization, privatization and restructuring -that the Brazilian state government had for the transformation of their state banks under the PROES in the late 1990s. Specifically, this paper explores (i) the factors behind the states' choices and (ii) the effects of the transformation process on bank performance and efficiency. We find that consistent with political economy theories, states that were more dependent on federal transfers, whose banks were already under federal intervention and that established development agencies, were more likely to relinquish control over their banks and its transformation process. We do not find any evidence for developmental factors behind state's choices and limited evidence for political factors. We find that privatized banks increased their performance, while restructured banks did not.
Introduction
While Gerschenkron suggested that the state-as-banker could overcome a legacy of poor financial intermediation, substitute for the absence of private banks, and impel economic growth in poorer nations, government-ownership of banks is in fact closely associated with an ensemble of problems that afflict developing countries: low levels of GDP per capita, financial backwardness, and a heavy and inefficient state sector (La Porta et al, 2001, Barth. Caprio and Levine, 2004; Dinc, 2003) . Privatization of government-owned banks could thus be expected to improve bank performance, and boost the efficiency of financial Under PROES, states had effectively four different choices concerning the future of their state banks. They could (i) liquidate them, (ii) allow the federal government to privatize, (iii) privatize themselves, or (iv) restructure them. Under the first three options, the federal government assumed 100% of any losses that occurred during the process, while it assumed 50% of the losses under the restructuring option. Further, states had the option to set up or split off a development agency. However, states could also opt out of the PROES program.
These different options implied different degrees to which state government gave up control over (i) the bank itself and (ii) the process under which the bank was resolved or restructured.
Political economy models predict a trade-off between the benefits of having the state bank as patronage tool (or using the privatization process to impose conditionality on the buyer) and the fiscal costs of continuous losses. Unlike before 1994, these losses could not be externalized to the federal government anymore. Developmental theories predict a relation between the perceived need for state involvement in the financial sector and the state's willingness or reluctance to give up control over its bank. Political scientists would predict the relationship and political alignment between state and federal level of government to be a decisive factor behind the PROES decision. The different options under PROES, however, can also be expected to have different consequences for operational and financial restructuring and thus the subsequent performance of these banks.
The two questions addressed in this paper are important for both academics and policymakers. First and most generally, the results help us assess the effect of bank privatization on performance and compare it to the effect of restructuring and staying in government ownership. These results can inform policymakers in Brazil and other countries with fragile government banks. Second, the results help us evaluate different approaches to privatization, specifically, intervention and subsequent privatization by the federal government versus privatization by the original owner, the state government. Third, it helps us understand the factors behind the political process of bank privatization, and ultimately the determinants of continued government ownership of banks around the globe.
The Brazilian PROES offers us a natural experiment to study the determinants and consequences of a state bank resolution program. The large number of banks that were resolved over a short time period -all but two states owned banks -, a relatively equal distribution of banks across the different policy alternatives, and the variation in economic and political structure across states, allow us to relate variation in political and economic structure of states to the political decision on their banks, and to relate subsequent performance of these banks to the different choices states made.
The available data and short time passed since PROES, however, also limit our analysis. First, we restrict our evaluation of the PROES to bank performance rather than assess the impact on economic and financial development on the state level; given that some state banks have been privatized only recently and some federalized state banks have not been privatized yet, such an analysis would reduce the degrees of freedom substantially. Second, we face a selection bias since the state banks that were liquidated or converted into development agencies are not included in our bank-level sample that we use to assess their performance. Third, the bank-level data that we have available do not allow us to test more sophisticated models of profit and cost efficiency.
Our results indicate provide support for political economy theories of public ownership, while they are inconsistent with developmental theories. States that were more dependent on federal transfers, whose banks were already under federal intervention and that established development agencies, were more likely to relinquish control over their banks and its transformation process. We find significant and positive effects of privatization on banks'
performance, while we cannot find similar improvements for banks that restructured. Only in few cases, however, these performance improvements went beyond the performance of privately owned domestic banks.
This paper is closely related to a series of papers by Cull (1999, 2002) on the Argentine privatization process of provincial banks. Similarly to Brazil, the Argentine privatization process started after an exogenous event that made further federal subsidization of provincial banks impossible and happened during a relatively short time period. Unlike in the Brazilian case, Argentine provinces faced only the option of privatization to receive federal funding. Analyzing the timing of the privatization, Clarke and Cull find that consistent with political economy models of privatization provinces with poorly performing banks and thus higher costs of government ownership were more likely to privatize their banks, while provinces where politicians could derive higher benefits showed a lower probability. Clarke and Cull also find performance and efficiency improvements postprivatization.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 offers background information on Brazil's banking system and the privatization process. Section 3 tests different hypotheses on the state government's decisions on their banks under PROES.
Section 4 describes the data and the methodology for the bank-level performance regressions.
Section 5 presents the results of the bank-level regressions and section 6 concludes.
Bank privatization in Brazil
One of the more remarkable features of Brazil's move toward privatization in the 1990s was the progressive dismantling of debt-ridden state banks. State banks constituted an important segment of the public bank sector; state owned and federally owned banks together constituted over 50% of overall banking system assets in 1994 ( under PROES has contributed significantly to the decrease in government ownership in the Brazilian banking system. By end-1999 it has fallen to 43% of total assets. This decline has been accompanied by a significant increase in foreign participation in the Brazilian banking system (Table 1) . 21 We also tried a simple dummy variable that takes value one if a bank is restructured and zero otherwise. The use of dummy variables as dependent and as independent variables (see below), however, posed econometric problems. 22 We also re-ran the regressions without the states whose bank was intervened under RAET and obtain the same results as reported below.
PROES and the determinants of the different options
Political economy theory predicts that state governments assess the trade-off between (i) the political benefits of keeping their banks under state ownership to use them as patronage tools or at least keeping as much control over the resolution process as possible (by being able to impose certain conditions on the purchaser) and (ii) the fiscal costs of doing so. By offering to take over 100% of losses incurred during the resolution process, but only 50% if the state kept ownership over at least one bank, the federal government tipped the monetary balance against restructuring. This intuition provides us with our first set of hypotheses relating the economic conditions of the state and its bank to the character of the reform decision. States with larger fiscal deficits and more dependent on federal transfers would most likely be more inclined to accept the options of liquidating or privatizing their banks.
States with larger GDP per capita and lower poverty rates would be less willing to give up their banks, given that they have more fiscal resources. State banks with worse performance and lower efficiency would be more likely to be privatized or liquidated given their higher cost to the state's budget.
Theories focusing on the developmental character of state banks provide us with several other predictions about the relationship between a state's economic structure, and the government's willingness to give up its state bank. Unlike political economy theories, developmental theories do not see state banks as patronage tools to distribute benefits to narrow and small groups, but rather focus on their benefits for the overall economy and society. First, developmental theories would predict that poorer states -depending more on federal transfers -would be rather less willing to give up their banks. Second, given the long tradition of providing agricultural credit through government-owned banks, these theories would also predict states with larger agricultural sectors to be less likely to give up their banks. Similarly, developmental theories would predict that state banks with more retail orientation would be less likely to be privatized or liquidated. success at pulling down resources for their states, however, depends at least in part on their ties to the president. Two measures are incorporated below to test the hypothesis that political ties mattered to the reform of state banks. For state governors, we employ first a dummy variable indicating whether they are members of the president's political party (the PSDB) at the time of the bank reform. We also consider a broader measure, whether the governor is a member of any one of the parties that comprise the president's cabinet coalition. For congressional delegations, we incorporate a measure of the proportion of the deputies from each state that are members of the PSDB, and similarly the proportion that are members of parties included in the president's coalition. In all of these, we expect membership in the president's coalition and party to be positive related to the chances that the state was able to restructure and keep its bank.
We assess the explanatory power of political economy and developmental theories of The results in Table 3 provide evidence for political economy explanations of the transformation process, but are not consistent with developmental explanations of the transformation process. The results indicate that states that depend more on federal transfers and that set up development agencies were more likely to relinquish control over their banks and over the transformation process. The federal government was both more burdened by high-transfer states, and likely exercised more leverage over them in debt renegotiations. Not surprisingly, banks that were already intervened under RAET in 1994 and 1995 were less likely to be restructured and then returned to the hands of the governor. Whether a state was rich or poor does not appear to matter to the outcome. Neither GDP per capita nor the poverty rate enter significantly. Nor do any characteristics of the bank's performance seem to matter for how it was dealt with. None of the bank efficiency measures nor our indicator of retail orientation -the share of savings deposits in total assets--enter significantly in the regression.
Finally, only one of the partisan political variables enters significantly, but only weakly so, and with a sign that is in opposition to the intuition sketched above. The share of the state's 23 We do not include the two states without state banks and the Federal District, which opted out of the PROES, but also shows some specific characteristics. We do, however, include Paraiba, since it privatized its state bank, though outside the PROES; our results, however, are not robust to its inclusion. We also include São Paulo as privatization under the federal government. For the regressions including bank-level performance indicators as explanatory variables, we lose observations since we do not have observations for most of the liquidated banks.
In the cases where we have bank-level data for more than one state bank, we average these data. 24 While the observed variable Transformation has only four outcomes, there is a continuous underlying unobserved variable, the political preference of state governments. Each outcome of Transformation corresponds to a specific range of political preferences. We use standard maximum likelihood estimation with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors.
congressional delegation that belonged to the president's party actually enters negatively at the 10% level. The hypothesis was that the effect should be positive-stronger ties to the president could be expected to translate into a greater likelihood of having the state bank restructured, not liquidated. The result here indicates that the closer the state's congressional delegation was to the president, the more likely the state bank was to be liquidated or privatized. A conjectural explanation for this fact is that, ceteris paribus, the executive actually found it easier to do away with state banks in states where he had stronger ties to the congressional delegates, since he could compensate them with political currency more readily within the party, while simultaneously wielding greater punitive powers within the party as well if they opposed the elimination of the state bank.
These results have to be interpreted with an important caveat. The small number of observations does not allow us to control for many different factors simultaneously.
Idiosyncratic differences between the states are not captured in our regression. Finally, the time dimension, the fact that the states did not take the decision simultaneously is not explicitly modeled in our regressions. 
Bank-level regressions: data and methodology
In order to assess the performance and efficiency effects of the different PROES Overhead costs/assets are the total administrative costs relative to total assets. The first two indicators are measures of profitability, while the third one is a measure of efficiency.
There is a wide variation in performance and efficiency across banks and over time (Table 4) . ROE and ROA vary between high negative and positive outliers, with averages of -13 and zero percent respectively. In the case of the return on equity, however, this is driven by the negative outliers; the median is 3%. 26 Overhead costs relative to total assets vary between zero and 69%, with a mean of 2% and a median of 1%. Banks with higher overhead costs show lower profitability (Table 4 Panel B).
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To assess the effect of privatization on bank performance, while controlling for other bank characteristics, we utilize the following regression: The high negative outliers in the case of ROE are also explained by the following adjustment we make in the case of negative equity: we set equity at 1% of assets to avoid that a bank with negative equity and losses shows a positive ROE. 27 Note that these are quarterly data. For annualized data, these would have to be multiplied by four. Since we use a linear estimation model, there is only a scaling effect.
where Performance is one of three variables measuring the performance of bank i in quarter t. Those variables include return on equity (ROE), return on assets (ROA), and the ratio of overhead costs to total assets.
We use a vector of explanatory variables to de-compose the causes and effects of privatization. The first is Eventually Privatized, a dummy variable that equals one throughout the whole sample for state banks that were privatized by the state government at some point. banks have a higher share of savings deposits relative to assets, which we explain by a higher retail orientation, while foreign banks have a lower share.
We control for the ownership structure of banks beyond the PROES. Specifically, we introduce dummy variables for the federally owned banks and for foreign-owned banks;
privately owned domestic banks are the omitted category. We also include a number of variables to control for the size of the bank and its business orientation. Assets is the log of real assets measured at time t-1. Larger banks might have enjoyed scale or scope economies that had positive effects on their performance. Further, we include the ratio of fixed assets to total assets and the share of savings deposits over total assets to thus control for the business orientation of the bank. Finally, we control for year and season-specific effects. Specifically, we introduce dummy variables for the different years and for the four quarters.
Sine we work with quarterly data and the effect of the transformation process might not be immediately effective, we drop the two quarters following immediately the transformation date. However, as noted below, we test for sensitivity of dropping these two periods.
Our sample contains data for both consolidated and unconsolidated banks.
Specifically, we use unconsolidated balance sheet and income statement information for bank groups, which include former state-owned banks, while we use consolidated information for other banks in our sample. To control for a potential selection bias, we introduce a dummy variable that takes the value one for banks for which we use unconsolidated information, i.e.
which belonged to a bank group at some point during the sample period. We also introduce an interaction term of this dummy variable with the log of total assets.
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The quality of the data poses a challenge for estimation. Variation in the quality of reporting across banks and over time is exacerbated by the fact that our dataset was assembled from different databases of the Brazilian Central Bank. The mix of banks with consolidated and unconsolidated balance sheet information introduces another source of measurement error. All these factors bias our estimations against finding any significant relationship between the transformation process and bank performance. Following Cull, Matesova and
Shirley (2002), we deal with this problem in two different ways. First, we restrict the sample to values of the dependent variable between the 1 st and the 99 th percentiles to thus exclude outliers such as discussed above. Second, we use a robust estimation technique that uses all observations available, but assigns different weights to avoid the impact of outliers. 28 We also considered using the total assets of the group instead of mixing consolidated and unconsolidated assets. However, this would introduce unnecessary noise since for privatized banks, total assets would jump in the period in which they are purchased by a large bank and thus bias the coefficient on Privatized and Privatized after Federalization towards zero.
Specifically, observations are weighted based on absolute residuals, with observations with large residuals being assigned smaller weights. Unlike in the case of the truncated sample, where we assign a zero weight a-priori to observations with extreme values and one to all others, the robust regressions assign these weights in an iterative process.
We use several additional tests. First, we test for differences across different state banks that underwent different treatments during PROES, including state banks that did not participate. This provides us with an additional test -beyond the estimations in section 3 -of whether a state government's decision for a specific option was influenced by its bank's performance. Second, we test whether the different policy options achieved its purpose, i.e.
improved the negative performance that was the trigger for the PROES in the first place.
Third, we compare the performance impact of the different options with each other.
PROES and bank performance
Tables 5 and 6 present our main results. Table 3 that the economic situation of these banks did not impact the political decision that state governments took on these banks. 29 The regressions also indicate that federal banks have worse performance than privately owned domestic banks, while foreign-owned have lower overhead costs, but also lower ROA and ROE than privately owned domestic banks. Further, larger banks have lower overhead costs; banks with a higher share of fixed assets have lower returns on assets and equity, while banks with a larger share of savings deposits have higher overhead costs.
We find strong evidence that privatization by state governments and federalization has significant effects on performance, increasing ROA and ROE and decreasing overhead costs.
In the case of privatization by the federal government, most of the improvement follows federalization; there is only limited evidence of a further increase in ROA and ROE (only in the robust regressions) and no evidence of further decreases in overhead costs after privatization. 30 There is evidence of performance improvements through restructuring of state 29 Of course, there is the possibility that there is a correlation between under-reporting of losses and true financial situation of these banks, which could explain that we do not have any significant differences between state banks that went through different transformation options. 30 Note, however, that both dummy variables enter jointly significantly in all but one regression.
banks; however, this evidence is not robust across different estimation techniques, most likely caused by measurement error in the timing of the restructuring. Finally, we note that there is not much difference in coefficient size and significance in the ROE and ROA regressions that exclude and include overhead costs/assets, so that any performance improvements were beyond efficiency gains.
Did transformation close the initial gap to privately owned domestic banks? The tests in Panel B of Table 5 suggest differences in the extent to which the different options had success in making up for the initial underperformance of state banks. First, the federalization and subsequent privatization increased returns on assets and equity beyond that of privately owned domestic banks, but did not help reduce overhead costs from their initially high level.
Second, in the case of state banks privatized by the states, privatization could not make up for the initially low ROE, but improved ROA and lowered overhead costs beyond the initially low level. Third, there is not consistent evidence on the success of federalization beyond the original underperformance; while most tests enter significantly, the signs differ across different estimation methods. Finally, the restructuring of state banks could not make up for the initial underperformance.
Restructuring state banks seemed to have been the least successful option, while we cannot find significant differences between the other alternatives. The tests in Panel B of The results in Table 6 Panel B suggest that two years after the privatization or restructuring, only privatization by the federal government led to improvements in returns on assets and equity beyond the gap to privately owned domestic banks, while still not making up for the initially high overhead costs. Here we evaluate the effect of different PROES options two years after the action. As in Table 5B , we find that federalization and privatization increases returns on assets and equity beyond the initially low level. In the case of privatization by the state, we find an improvement beyond the initial gap to privately owned domestic banks only in the case of overhead costs, while there is no improvement in ROE beyond the initially low level. Unlike the regressions of Table 5 , here we do not find any consistent evidence for the ROA regressions. In the case of federalization (with pending privatization), we cannot find any consistent evidence across the different estimation techniques. Restructuring, on the other hand, has not helped make up for initially low performance.
The tests in Panel B of Table 6 suggest that restructuring was the least successful PROES options. Restructured state banks show less improvement in ROA than other transformed state banks and less reduction in overhead costs than privatized and federalized banks. We also find evidence that privatization by the federal government led to greater improvement in ROA than privatization by the state government and that federalized banks experienced larger reductions in overhead costs than banks privatized by state governments.
We assessed the robustness of our bank-level results along several dimensions. First, we re-ran the regressions in Tables 5 and 6 using clustered errors.
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While the coefficient estimates are the same as under OLS regressions presented in Tables 5 and 6 , the regressions in Table 7 control for correlations between error terms for individual banks. While the significance of many coefficients decreases, our main findings are confirmed when we use clustered error terms.
We also tested the robustness of our results to the number of periods we drop after the PROES action. Specifically, we re-ran all regressions, dropping no period and one period after federalization, privatization or restructuring. Again, our main results are confirmed.
We also re-ran our regressions controlling for changes in ownership unrelated to PROES (mostly M&A activity between private banks) and other jumps in the data that we cannot account for. Even after controlling for these potential sources of measurement error, our main findings are again confirmed.
Finally, we assessed the absolute and relative success of the different PROES options at time periods other than two years after action. When we evaluate the success of the different options at three years after transformation, both relative to the initially low performance and efficiency and relative to each other, we confirm our main findings.
Conclusions
The reduction of state-owned banks in Brazil, to most observers, was part of a larger process of banking reform in the wake of the Real plan, and indeed part of an even larger process of privatization. But it also had unique features that distinguish it. State banks, more than other government-owned firms, had long served as machines for patronage and political rents. They required repeated bailouts, had poor operating ratios, and dismal efficiency. The central role of financial intermediation in economic development made the transformation of state banks especially important.
This paper evaluated the program of state bank transformation in the late 1990s, analyzing both the factors explaining the different options that state governments chose for their banks, as the effect of the different transformation options on performance. We find that political economy theories can explain states' choices best. The stronger the dependence on budget transfers from the federal government, the more likely a state is to agree to liquidation or privatization directly by the federal government. States that had other patronage tools in the form of development agencies and whose banks were already under federal control were also more likely to agree to give up control over their bank. Interestingly, economic and social factors cannot explain the government choices made under PROES.
We find a significant performance improvement for privatized and federalized banks, but not for restructured banks. While we certainly face measurement errors in the case of restructured banks, we interpret this as evidence in favor of relinquishing state ownership control. These conclusions are further supported by tests that restructuring seemed to be the least successful transformation method compared with the other options, measured both over the sample period as at specific points after the transformation process took place. 
